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The Effects of Derivatives on Firm Risk
and Value
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Abstract
Using a large sample of nonfinancial firms from 47 countries, we examine the effect of
derivative use on firm risk and value. We control for endogeneity by matching users and
nonusers on the basis of their propensity to use derivatives. We also use a new technique
to estimate the effect of omitted variable bias on our inferences. We find strong evidence
that the use of financial derivatives reduces both total risk and systematic risk. The effect
of derivative use on firm value is positive but more sensitive to endogeneity and omitted
variable concerns. However, using derivatives is associated with significantly higher value,
abnormal returns, and larger profits during the economic downturn in 2001–2002, suggest-
ing that firms are hedging downside risk.
I. Introduction
Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction.
—Warren E. Buffett, 2003 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 has brought new scrutiny to the use of
financial derivatives. Recent proposals in major countries, including the United
States, call for greater regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, includ-
ing conditions for marking positions to market prices, trade registration, trade
clearing, exchange trading, and higher capital and margin requirements.
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The derivative securities that have caused the most harm during this eco-
nomic downturn have been those held by financial firms. In contrast, there have
been relatively few instances of problems with derivatives at nonfinancial firms
in the current downturn.1 As a consequence, in response to the proposed new
regulations of derivatives, many nonfinancial firms in the U.S. (including energy
producers, airlines, and industrial equipment manufacturers) have started lobby-
ing Congress, arguing that the proposed rule changes may “drive U.S. companies
to seek financing overseas, . . . [impair firms’ ability to] manage fluctuations in
materials prices, commodities, fuel, interest rates, and foreign currency,” and, in
general, materially harm the 90% of Fortune 500 companies that use financial
derivatives to manage risk.2
In fact, although data on derivatives usage have become available in the last
2 decades, detailed empirical evidence on the effects of derivative use on firms’
risk and value is still mixed. For example, using a sample of firms that initiate
derivative use, Guay (1999) finds that the total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and risk ex-
posures to interest rate changes of these firms decline, but he finds no significant
change in the market risk of these firms. In contrast, Hentschel and Kothari (2001)
find that the difference in risk for firms that use derivatives is economically small
compared to firms that do not use them. Allayannis and Weston (2001) present ev-
idence that hedging foreign currency risk is associated with large (approximately
4%) increases in market value; Graham and Rogers (2002) find that hedging can
add an economically significant 1.1% to firms’ market value by allowing firms
to increase their debt capacity. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) show that the
magnitude of the cash flows generated by hedge portfolios is modest and unlikely
to account for such large changes in value. Consistent with this, Jin and Jorion
(2006) use a sample of oil and gas producers and find insignificant effects of
hedging on market value.
In this paper, we also examine the effect of derivative use on firms’ risk and
market values. We use a new, larger data set that includes 6,888 nonfinancial firms
headquartered in 47 different countries. In addition to providing greater statisti-
cal power for our tests, our data set covers a wide range of derivative use and risk
measures. Specifically, we investigate the impact of the use of exchange rate (FX),
interest rate (IR), and commodity price (CP) derivatives on cash flow volatility,
the standard deviation of stock returns, and market betas, as well as market val-
ues. The data set also allows us to measure the effect of derivative use on firms
during a sample period that includes a sharp market correction: the global reces-
sion of 2001. Consequently, we are able to examine the extent to which firms,
either through their use of derivative contracts or other methods (e.g., operational
hedges), can mitigate a marketwide decline. Evidence on whether derivative use
1The exception is a series of significant losses among some Brazilian and Mexican nonfinancial
companies that appear to have undertaken speculative currency trades that went bad in 2008 as local
currencies depreciated rapidly against major currencies, especially the U.S. dollar. The relative paucity
of problems in 2008–2009 among nonfinancial firms may be due to the fact that, following systematic
problems arising from losses involving derivatives among nonfinancial firms in the early 1990s, many
large nonfinancial corporations adopted strict risk management policies for hedging with derivatives.
2See “Big Companies Go to Washington to Fight Regulations on Fancy Derivatives,” by Kara
Scannell, The Wall Street Journal (July 10, 2009, p. B1).
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can provide protection against systematic declines for some firms is particularly
useful when the costs and benefits of additional regulation on these markets is
being considered.
Figure 1 provides some insights into our primary findings by plotting the
time series of cumulative returns, volatility, and market betas for portfolios of
derivative users and nonusers from 1998 through the end of 2003. These results
FIGURE 1
Cumulative Returns of Users and Nonusers
Figure 1 shows various characteristics of (U.S. dollar) market-value weighted portfolios of derivative users and nonusers
from 1998 through 2003. Graph A plots cumulative returns for the portfolios of users (dashed line) and nonusers (solid line)
as well as the world market index. Graph B plots the annualized standard deviation (volatility) of each portfolio calculated
using a rolling 3-month window. Graph C plots market betas of each portfolio calculated using a rolling 3-month window.
A derivative user is defined as a firm using any type of derivative in 2000 or 2001. The indices are constructed using daily
returns obtained from averaging returns each day for all firms with available return data. Returns are measured in local
currency. In Graph A, both users and nonusers outperform the world market index because we exclude financial firms and
utilities that significantly underperform other stocks over this period.
Graph A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Graph B. Volatilities
Graph C. Portfolio Betas
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must be interpreted with caution, since we do not account for the firm-level dif-
ferences between users and nonusers; however, they are indicative of our results.
Graph A shows that during the 2000–2001 period, users’ returns seem to in-
crease and decrease less than those of nonusers. These return patterns suggest
that users may be on average less volatile and have lower market betas than those
of nonusers. To examine this more directly, Graph B plots volatilities of users and
nonusers for 3-month rolling windows over the same period. The plots show that
users tend to have lower volatility, especially during the bear market from 2000
to 2002.3 Graph C plots estimates of market betas also calculated from 3-month
rolling windows. While the average betas of the portfolios are about the same, the
portfolio of users tends to have a lower beta during down markets.
The evidence in Figure 1 suggests that, at the aggregate level, firms that
use derivatives may do so to reduce risk, and particularly to reduce the risk of
down markets. At the firm level we also obtain results suggesting that firms use
derivatives to reduce risk. Users of derivatives are more exposed to exchange rate
risk (due to more foreign sales, foreign income, and foreign assets) and interest
rate risk (due to higher leverage and lower quick ratios) before considering the
potential effects of risk management with derivatives. They are also more likely to
belong to commodity-based industries that are exposed to commodity price risk.
Nonetheless, derivative users exhibit unconditional average cash flow volatility
that is almost 50% lower than that of nonusers and stock return volatility that is
on average 18% lower than the return volatility of nonusers. In addition, firms
that use derivatives have market betas that are on average 6% lower than those of
nonusers. Consistent with other papers, we also find that, on average, derivative
users tend to be larger and older firms. Consequently, the unadjusted Tobin’s q of
the average derivative user is approximately 17% lower than that of the average
firm that does not use derivatives.
One factor that affects the interpretation of these results, and may generate
some of the differences across studies, is endogeneity. That is, a significant dif-
ference in the risk measures of firms that use, or do not use, derivatives could
be due to omitted control variables that determine firm risk and risk management
practices; alternatively, omitting these variables may mask important differences
among firms that arise because of differences in hedging behavior. Endogeneity
also affects the interpretation of results: Derivative use may be driven by, rather
than a determinant of, differences in risk. As a result, riskier firms may use deriva-
tives so that their (after-hedging) risk profile is indistinguishable from inherently
less risky nonusers. The papers cited previously use different approaches to con-
trol for endogeneity. Some authors use econometric procedures such as simultane-
ous equations to account for this problem (see, e.g., Graham and Rogers (2002)).
Others choose samples to mitigate selection bias. Jin and Jorion (2006), for exam-
ple, control for any significant difference in the hedging propensity of firms across
industries by examining firms in a single industry. By examining only firms that
3In fact, average volatilities for the portfolio of users is 0.5% lower than for nonusers. When we
split the sample into bear-market (April 1, 2000–December 31, 2002) and bull-market (all other dates)
periods, we find that users have lower volatility in both periods, but the difference is greater during the
bear-market period. Specifically, volatilities go up for both groups, but by twice as much for nonusers.
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initiate derivative use, Guay (1999) uses the same firm prior to derivative use as a
control. Of course, although these choices reduce selection bias, they also impose
constraints on the data beyond the usual ones of data availability.
In multivariate tests, we control for the endogenous nature of the decision to
use derivatives using a propensity score matching technique; in addition, we are
able to provide some evidence for how large any remaining hidden bias would
have to be to change inferences drawn from our analysis. Propensity score match-
ing allows us to match firms on the basis of their estimated likelihood of using
derivatives, rather than matching on a large number of individual firm character-
istics. Specifically, using a binary variable to measure derivative use, we directly
estimate firms’ propensity to use derivatives based on their characteristics, and
then we match firms that use derivatives to those firms that do not use derivatives,
based on this propensity. Controlling for firms’ likelihood to use derivatives, we
find that derivative use is associated with lower cash flow volatility, lower stan-
dard deviation of returns, lower systematic risk, and weakly higher market values.
Derivative users have 7%–18% lower cash flow volatility, 5%–10% lower stan-
dard deviation of returns, and 15%–31% lower betas than matching firms that do
not use derivatives, depending on the set of characteristics used to estimate the
propensity to hedge.4 We also find higher Tobin’s q for derivative users, although
the differences are not always statistically significant.
As mentioned previously, any analysis of cross-sectional differences in firm
characteristics related to derivative use must be concerned about endogeneity or
bias due to an omitted control variable. Using a relatively new technique, we are
able to estimate the extent to which our inferences may be driven by a hidden
selection bias. Specifically, using the method developed in Rosenbaum (2002),
we find that for a hidden selection bias related to an unobserved characteristic to
affect our inferences regarding the effect of derivative use on risk, it would have
to be large (e.g., equivalent to approximately a 2-standard-deviation difference in
leverage or more than a doubling in market capitalization). Thus, while we cannot
rule out the possibility that our risk results are driven by an unmeasured selection
bias in our sample, the unmeasured characteristics related to that selection bias
would generally have to be quite economically significant (as well as unrelated to
the large number of observables for which we control). In contrast, the results with
respect to value appear to be quite sensitive to the presence of a hidden selection
bias. In turn, this sensitivity could explain why value results from previous studies
are mixed. Overall, our results suggest that the effect of derivative use in the cross
section is associated with a decline in both total and systematic risk; the effect on
value is positive, but weaker.
We also examine the differences in risk and value measures associated with
derivative use through time. Firms that use derivatives have consistently lower
total risk and betas throughout the 1998–2003 sample period. However, the re-
sults provide evidence that using derivatives is more important for firm value
during the global economic decline in 2001. This may be because of a change
in the (perceived) value of risk management, with the relative value of firms that
4Results for cash flow volatility, total risk, and market risk are always statistically significant at
better than the 0.1% level.
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use derivatives increasing during an economic decline. Alternatively, these results
may simply reflect the unstable nature of the value results. However, when we
examine average alphas (from the market-model regressions that generate mar-
ket betas), we also find that firms that use derivatives significantly outperform
firms that do not use derivatives during this period. In addition, profit measures
of derivative users, whether measured as earnings, cash flow, or return on assets
(ROA), are consistently higher than those of firms that do not use derivatives dur-
ing 2000–2002 (as opposed to 1998, 1999, and 2003, when the differences are not
as consistently large or significant).
We perform additional analysis on the relation between derivative use, risk,
and financial distress. We find evidence that firms that use derivatives tend to have
lower Z-scores, but similar expected default probabilities. This suggests that firms
that use derivatives for financial risk management may be able to increase other
risks (for which they may get compensated) without an overall increase in the
chance of financial distress. We also examine whether the effects of derivative
use on risk differ by derivative type, or by firms’ access to derivative markets.
We find little evidence that derivative type matters. We find some evidence that a
portion of the benefits of derivative use decline with reduced access; in particular,
the reduction in cash flow volatility is mitigated if firms have poorer access to
derivative markets.
Our results suggest, at a minimum, that firms reduce cash flow risk, total
risk, and systematic risk significantly through financial risk management with
derivatives. This result is robust to controlling for differences in a large number of
firm characteristics, as well as differences in country and industry. Thus, while it
may be difficult to preclude all instances of improper or fraudulent use of deriva-
tive instruments, these findings can provide some reassurance to policymakers,
regulators, and shareholders (or other stakeholders in the firm, for that matter),
who are concerned that widespread derivatives speculation by nonfinancial cor-
porations puts the firm at greater risk. The effect on market value associated with
this risk reduction, however, is less certain.
II. Frequency and Effect of Derivative Use by Firms
Beginning with Modigliani and Miller (MM) (1958), a firm managed by
value-maximizing agents, in a world of perfect capital markets, with investors
who have equal access to these markets, would not engage in hedging activities,
since they add no value. Anything the firm could accomplish through hedging
could equally well be accomplished by the investor acting on his or her own ac-
count. If the perfect capital markets assumption is not met, however, there may be
rational reasons for the firm to hedge.
The theoretical literature on hedging relaxes the MM (1958) assumptions and
develops specific reasons why individual firms may optimally choose to hedge.
As one might expect, these reasons tend to involve either market frictions, such
as taxes, transactions costs, and informational asymmetries, or agency problems.
For example, Smith and Stulz (1985) show that a convex tax function implies
that a firm can reduce expected tax liabilities by using hedges to smooth taxable
income. In addition, hedging may increase a firm’s debt capacity, enabling it to
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add value by increasing the value of the debt tax shield (Leland (1998)). Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) show that managers facing external financing costs
may use hedging to reduce the probability that internal cash flows are insufficient
to cover investments; Smith and Stulz show that hedging can reduce expected
costs of distress.
Agency problems may cause managers and investors to view the risk-return
trade-offs of the firm differently and lead to the use of derivative contracts. For
example, if managerial compensation leaves the manager holding a large portfolio
of undiversified firm risk, the manager may have a larger incentive to hedge (Stulz
(1984)). Alternatively, if a large fraction of managers’ compensation comes in the
form of out-of-the-money stock options, the manager may have an incentive to
use derivatives to take on, rather than lay off, firm risk. DeMarzo and Duffie
(1995) argue that hedging may allow investors to assess managers’ abilities more
precisely and consequently develop more efficient compensation contracts.
Empirically, the use of derivatives by firms appears to be widespread. A large
number of studies have documented the extent and nature of derivatives use by
nonfinancial firms. Some of these studies are based on survey data, such as the
Wharton survey of U.S. nonfinancial firms (Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1996),
(1998), Bodnar, Hayt, Marston, and Smithson (1995)), as well as other surveys
of U.S. firms (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993)). Surveys also have been
conducted for selected countries outside the United States.5 Studies have provided
information on corporate derivatives use based on disclosure in annual reports
(Mian (1996), Ge´czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Graham and Smith (1999),
and Graham and Rogers (2002)). Finally, detailed data on derivatives use is avail-
able for a few industries, such as in the North American gold mining industry
(e.g., Tufano (1996), Brown, Crabb, and Haushalter (2006)) or the U.S. oil and
gas industry (Haushalter (2000)). Overall, these studies document that the use of
derivatives by nonfinancial firms tends to be the rule rather than the exception.
Empirical researchers have used data disclosed by firms to examine the ques-
tion of whether and how hedging affects the risks of the firm. The evidence is
mixed. Guay (1999) investigates a sample of 234 U.S. nonfinancial firms that
began using derivatives in the early 1990s and finds that measures of total and
idiosyncratic risk declined in the following year. He finds no significant evidence
for changes in systematic risk. Hentschel and Kothari (2001) examine the risk
characteristics of a panel of 425 large U.S. nonfinancial firms from 1991 to 1993.
Their results show no significant relationship between derivatives use and stock
return volatility even for firms with large derivatives positions.
In a study of the North American gold mining industry, Tufano (1996)
presents evidence that is consistent with the use of derivatives for hedging to re-
duce risk in response to risk aversion by managers and owners. Allayannis and
Ofek (2001) relate derivatives use to the foreign exchange rate exposure of a
5For example, survey data are available for Belgium (DeCeuster, Durinck, Laveren, and
Lodewyckx (2000)), Canada (Downie, McMillan, and Nosal (1996)), Germany (Bodnar and
Gebhardt (1999)), Hong Kong and Singapore (Sheedy (2002)), the Netherlands (Bodnar, Jong,
and Macrae (2003)), New Zealand (Berkman, Bradbury, and Magan (1997)), Sweden (Alkeback
and Hagelin (1999)), Switzerland (Loderer and Pichler (2000)), and the United Kingdom (Grant and
Marshall (1997)).
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sample of 378 U.S. nonfinancial firms and find that the use of derivatives sig-
nificantly reduces the exposure of the sample firms to exchange rate risk. In work
on mutual funds, Koski and Pontiff (1999) show that users of derivatives have
similar risk exposure and return performance to nonusers.
The evidence for the effect of derivative use on market value is also mixed.
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that firm value (as measured by Tobin’s q) is
higher for U.S. firms with foreign exchange exposure that use foreign currency
derivatives to hedge.6 Graham and Rogers (2002) calculate that the increase in
debt capacity and leverage associated with hedging increases firm value by an av-
erage of about 1.1%. However, Guay and Kothari (2003) estimate the cash flow
implications from hedging programs for 234 large U.S. nonfinancial firms and
find that the economic significance of the cash flows, and consequently the in-
ferred potential change in market values, is small. Jin and Jorion (2006) examine
119 firms in the oil and gas industry and also find that the effect of hedging on
market value is not statistically significant.
Overall, while there is substantial evidence of sustained and growing use of
derivatives by firms, the effect of this use on risk and value, and the mechanisms
by which value may be affected, are still unclear. Concerns about endogeneity ei-
ther limit the interpretation of the results or act to limit the sample (see, e.g., Aretz
and Bartram (2010)). In an attempt to mitigate these concerns, we use both a larger
sample and different methods to control for endogeneity. Our sample includes a
large number of U.S. and international firms and encompasses wide swings in
global economic conditions, which may create more dispersion in outcomes for
users and nonusers of derivatives. We use a matching method that controls for the
differences in the likelihood of using derivatives; this method also allows us to
conduct additional analyses on the extent to which the results may be sensitive to
a remaining hidden selection bias. Finally, we examine the difference in the ef-
fects of the global recession of 2000 and 2001 between firms that use derivatives
and those that do not.
III. Data
A. Sample and Data Sources
The markets for OTC instruments and exchange-traded derivative financial
instruments (options, futures, forwards, swaps, etc.) on foreign exchange rates,
interest rates, and commodity prices have exhibited exponential growth over the
past 20 years (e.g., Bartram (2000)). As a result, notional amounts outstanding
for OTC derivatives reached over $200 trillion in 2004, with interest rate deriva-
tives accounting for more than 3/4 of the total (Bank for International Settlements
(2005)). Along with increased use, regulation for the disclosure of derivatives
has developed, requiring firms in many countries to include information about
their derivatives’ positions in their annual report. In particular, firms in the United
States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as well as firms
6In related work, Rountree, Weston, and Allayannis (2008) find a negative relation between cash
flow volatility and firm value.
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complying with International Accounting Standards (IAS) are required to disclose
information on their derivatives positions; many other firms do so voluntarily.7
The resulting availability of data makes the empirical analysis of the use of deriva-
tives by nonfinancial firms in different countries possible.
The sample in this study comprises 6,888 nonfinancial firms from 47 coun-
tries including the United States. It consists of all firms that have accounting data
for either the year 2000 or 2001 on the Thomson Analytics database, that have an
annual report in English for the same year on the Global Reports database, that
are not part of the financial sector (banking, insurance, etc.) or a regulated util-
ity, and that have at least 36 nonmissing daily stock returns on Datastream during
the year of the annual report.8 The 47 countries represent 99% of global market
capitalization in 2000 and 2001, and the firms in the sample account for 60.6% of
overall global market capitalization or 76.8% of global market capitalization of
nonfinancial firms.9
Firms are classified as users or nonusers of derivatives based on a search
of their annual reports for information about the use of derivatives. The annual
reports are evaluated by an automated search. The list of search terms was com-
piled by manually analyzing a sample of 200 annual reports across all countries.10
After refining the list of search terms, the automated search routine led to an av-
erage reliability of 96.0% for a random sample of annual reports of 100 users and
100 nonusers. Subsequently, an index was created based on search hits of terms
that were too general to be included in the electronic search, but that are likely to
be related to derivative use.11 Since nonusers with high index scores, as well as
users with low index scores, are likely to be misclassified, we manually checked
the reports of another 1,709 firms based on this index. As a result, the reliabil-
ity of the classification improved further, yielding an estimated error rate from
a random sample of below 2%.12 In addition to the categorical data on deriva-
tives, information on the underlying asset (i.e., foreign exchange, interest rates,
7For example, the following are recent standards (and effective dates) adopted by so-called G4+1
countries and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) as part of the movement toward
common reporting standards: United States, FAS 133 (effective June 15, 1999); United Kingdom,
FRS 13 (effective March 23, 1999); Australia, AAS 33 (effective January 1, 2000); Canada, AcSB
Handbook Section 3860 (Financial Instruments - Disclosure and Presentation, effective January 1,
1996); New Zealand, FRS-31 (effective December 31, 1993); IASB, IAS 32 (March 1995, modified
March 1998 to reflect issuance of IAS 39 effective January 1, 2001).
8Global reports (www.global-reports.com) is an online information provider of public company
documents in full-color, portable document format (PDF).
9Since the data cover 2 years, these values are calculated as the sum of each firm’s percent of
global market capitalization for the year it appears.
10A full list of the search terms is available from the authors.
11The terms include futures, swap or swaps, swaption.*, collar.*, derivat.*, call option.* or put op-
tion.*, hedg.*, cash flow hedg.*, fair value hedg.*, risk management, effective portion.* or ineffective
portion.*, notional amount.*, option.*, contract.*, option.*, where “.*” signifies any additional char-
acters. The index sums the number of these terms found in the annual report (regardless of the number
of times) for a maximum score of 14.
12Even careful examination of the annual reports does not always give clear evidence whether a firm
uses derivatives or not, because some firms make very general statements about their risk management
policy or accounting practices without specifically addressing the particular year in question. Given
the systematic way of classifying firms and the fact that users appear to be misclassified about as often
as nonusers, the results should at worst suffer from some noise with little effect on the results across
the large sample of firms.
976 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
or commodity price) and types of instruments (i.e., forwards/futures, swaps, and
options) are collected.13
Summary statistics on the use of derivatives by the sample firms is presented
in Table 1. Across all countries, 60.5% of the firms in the sample use at least
one type of derivative. Exchange rate derivatives are the most common (45.5%),
followed by interest rate derivatives (33.1%) and commodity price derivatives
(9.8%). Though usage rates for particular types of instruments vary consider-
ably across countries, some clear patterns emerge. Forward contracts are the most
frequently used exchange rate derivatives, whereas swaps are the instrument of
choice for interest rate derivatives. For commodity price derivatives, the distri-
bution of instrument type is more even. Firms in the U.S. are less likely to use
exchange rate derivatives than non-U.S. firms, but U.S. firms are more frequent
users of interest rate and commodity price derivatives.
All capital market data (i.e., the firms’ stock return indices, stock market
return indices, and interest rates) are from Datastream. These data are provided at
a daily frequency. For each firm, we calculate stock returns in local currency. To
begin, all time series are limited to the year of the firm’s annual report. Account-
ing data originate from the Thomson Analytics database.14 Outliers are elimi-
nated by winsorizing observations in the top and bottom 1 percentile as well as
those observations where variable values exceed more than 5 standard deviations
from the median. This filter eliminates some apparent data errors where mag-
nitudes suggest data units are not properly reported (e.g., thousands instead of
millions). Systematic differences across countries and industries are controlled
for with country and 44 industry dummy variables. In order to avoid the cross-
sectional results being influenced by the effect of the economic cycle, we use
3-year averages of variables where this impact seems most relevant (e.g., cov-
erage, foreign income). In a separate analysis, we examine the performance of
derivative users and nonusers through time.
B. Risk Measures
In order to study the possible determinants of corporate derivatives use,
different categories of exposures to risk are employed. First, firms may differ
with regard to their gross or prehedging exposure.15 For instance, measures of
gross exposure with regard to foreign exchange rate risk include foreign sales
(relative to total sales), foreign income (relative to total income), and foreign
assets (relative to total assets). In addition to these individual proxies of foreign
13Dichotomous variables for the use of foreign debt and stock options are created in the same
fashion, since this information is not readily available elsewhere.
14Data are commonly reported in millions of U.S. dollars. Many of the variables we examine are
ratios and are therefore largely comparable across countries and years. However, we also examine a
dummy variable for the year (2000 or 2001) and have undertaken robustness checks to make sure that
our conclusions are not driven by which year we examine.
15To be precise, gross (or prehedging) exposure is a measure of exposure that does not incorporate










Summary Statistics of Derivatives Use of Sample Firms
Table 1 presents summary statistics of derivatives use by country. In particular, it presents the number of firms and the percentage of firms using derivatives, for general derivatives use, foreign exchange rate
derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and commodity price derivatives. Firms are required to be outside the financial and regulated utility sectors, and to have an annual report on the Global Reports database,
accounting data on Thomson Analytics, and at least 36 nonmissing daily stock returns for the year of the annual report on Datastream. We create a category called “Other countries” for countries with less than
10 observations (i.e., Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Egypt, Indonesia, Peru, Portugal, Turkey, and Venezuela).
Foreign Exchange Interest Rate Commodity Price
Rate Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives
Country Firms General General Forward Swap Option General Forward Swap Option General Future Swap Option
Argentina 10 70.0 70.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 30.0 40.0 0.0 20.0 30.0
Australia 301 66.4 52.2 48.5 8.6 17.9 42.2 3.7 38.9 15.0 14.3 2.0 3.7 5.0
Austria 41 56.1 56.1 43.9 17.1 22.0 22.0 0.0 17.1 7.3 7.3 2.4 4.9 2.4
Belgium 60 50.0 36.7 26.7 8.3 6.7 23.3 0.0 21.7 3.3 3.3 0.0 1.7 0.0
Brazil 16 81.3 56.3 18.8 25.0 12.5 18.8 0.0 12.5 6.3 18.8 0.0 6.3 0.0
Canada 537 60.3 46.2 34.3 8.0 8.2 27.2 0.4 24.2 3.2 17.7 2.8 5.2 5.4
Chile 13 100.0 84.6 61.5 23.1 7.7 53.8 0.0 38.5 7.7 15.4 0.0 7.7 7.7
China 32 12.5 6.3 6.3 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 0.0 3.1 3.1 0.0 0.0
Czech Republic 23 26.1 13.0 13.0 4.3 4.3 17.4 0.0 13.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Denmark 80 87.5 80.0 72.5 12.5 18.8 26.3 1.3 21.3 6.3 5.0 1.3 2.5 1.3
Finland 100 64.0 58.0 45.0 18.0 27.0 37.0 9.0 29.0 17.0 8.0 3.0 1.0 3.0
France 159 66.0 52.8 37.1 22.6 25.8 44.7 1.9 38.4 15.1 3.8 1.3 1.3 0.6
Germany 395 47.1 39.0 27.3 10.6 12.4 24.1 1.8 17.7 9.4 4.8 1.8 0.5 0.5
Greece 19 21.1 21.1 10.5 5.3 5.3 10.5 0.0 10.5 0.0 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.0
Hong Kong 319 23.2 18.5 13.8 4.4 1.3 7.2 0.3 5.6 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 15 40.0 33.3 33.3 6.7 13.3 13.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 6.7 0.0
India 40 70.0 62.5 60.0 7.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 5.0 2.5 0.0 0.0
Ireland 46 84.8 69.6 63.0 28.3 8.7 52.2 4.3 47.8 8.7 13.0 2.2 6.5 4.3
Israel 48 72.9 68.8 43.8 2.1 22.9 12.5 0.0 10.4 4.2 2.1 2.1 0.0 0.0
Italy 93 61.3 38.7 29.0 16.1 3.2 33.3 3.2 23.7 3.2 2.2 1.1 2.2 0.0
Japan 366 81.1 75.4 71.0 33.1 17.8 60.4 0.5 59.3 14.2 9.6 3.8 1.6 1.6
Korea, Republic of 24 70.8 54.2 41.7 20.8 12.5 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 4.2
Luxembourg 11 63.6 45.5 45.5 9.1 18.2 27.3 0.0 18.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0
Malaysia 289 20.1 16.3 12.5 1.4 0.7 4.2 0.0 3.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Mexico 35 60.0 34.3 25.7 5.7 11.4 37.1 2.9 37.1 0.0 14.3 8.6 2.9 2.9
Netherlands 131 56.5 48.1 38.9 18.3 12.2 33.6 1.5 27.5 9.2 4.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
New Zealand 39 94.9 79.5 74.4 17.9 35.9 76.9 5.1 71.8 33.3 17.9 0.0 10.3 10.3
Norway 85 67.1 56.5 48.2 17.6 17.6 29.4 2.4 24.7 5.9 8.2 2.4 0.0 3.5
Other countries 21 52.4 42.9 33.3 19.0 4.8 9.5 0.0 9.5 0.0 9.5 0.0 4.8 9.5








Summary Statistics of Derivatives Use of Sample Firms
Foreign Exchange Interest Rate Commodity Price
Rate Derivatives Derivatives Derivatives
Country Firms General General Forward Swap Option General Forward Swap Option General Future Swap Option
Philippines 12 50.0 41.7 41.7 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 8.3 0.0 8.3 0.0
Poland 11 45.5 36.4 18.2 18.2 27.3 18.2 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore 218 55.5 50.9 42.7 6.0 3.7 11.5 0.5 9.6 1.8 2.3 0.0 1.8 0.0
South Africa 55 89.1 89.1 87.3 9.1 14.5 38.2 0.0 32.7 5.5 14.5 5.5 0.0 1.8
Spain 29 62.1 37.9 27.6 10.3 10.3 37.9 3.4 34.5 13.8 20.7 6.9 6.9 6.9
Sweden 135 63.7 45.2 35.6 7.4 8.1 13.3 2.2 9.6 2.2 4.4 0.7 0.7 1.5
Switzerland 119 77.3 68.1 61.3 14.3 23.5 42.9 3.4 35.3 7.6 5.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Thailand 25 72.0 68.0 56.0 36.0 0.0 24.0 4.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom 860 64.4 55.0 49.4 17.1 7.8 36.5 0.6 32.1 10.8 3.7 1.5 1.4 0.7
United States 2,076 65.1 37.8 30.9 6.4 7.5 40.4 0.7 36.0 6.8 16.1 6.0 5.2 3.3
All excl. U.S. 4,812 58.5 48.9 40.9 13.2 10.8 29.9 1.3 26.2 7.7 7.0 1.7 1.9 1.8
All firms 6,888 60.5 45.5 37.9 11.2 9.8 33.1 1.1 29.1 7.4 9.8 3.0 2.9 2.3
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exchange rate exposure, we create a variable Gross-FX-Exposure that is equal to
the sum of foreign sales and foreign assets (as percent of totals) multiplied by the
ratio of home-country exchange rate volatility to average exchange rate volatil-
ity (of all countries in our sample). This firm-specific and continuous variable
provides a sensible relative gauge of gross exchange rate exposure, since it in-
cludes measures of both the degree of foreign currency operations and the relative
volatility of the domestic currency. Foreign debt may create an exposure as well,
but it could also work as a hedge.
Leverage, coverage, or the quick ratio may be indicators for gross interest
rate exposure. With regard to commodity price exposure, we define an exposure
variable at the industry level using U.S. input-output data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis from calendar year 2000. For each industry in our sample,
we sum the value of inputs from commodity-sensitive industries and express it as
a percentage of total input values.16 The resulting variable, Gross-CP-Exposure,
ranges from a low of 1.6% for the recreation industry to a high of 73.9% for
the oil industry. Finally, firms may also have more incentive to hedge if they are
close to default. We use Altman’s (1968) Z-score measure as a proxy for financial
distress. For any of these measures, if firms are using derivatives primarily for
hedging purposes, firms should be more likely to use derivatives if they have high
measures of exposures.
Next, a firm’s net (or posthedging) exposure is the result of the character-
istics of its assets and liabilities, and ideally also includes the effects of off-
balance-sheet transactions such as derivatives.17 Our 1st measure of net exposure
is operating cash flow volatility (σCF), which we define as the standard deviation
of operating margins (operating cash flow divided by total sales) using 5 years
of annual data. However, operating cash flow may not be a good measure of
net exposure for several reasons. First, it is not measured with much precision
given the limited amount of data. Second, managers may be able to systemati-
cally manipulate values for accounting variables. Finally, operating cash flow may
not account for the use of all derivatives for all firms. Specifically, if exchange
rate and commodity price derivative transactions do not utilize (i.e., qualify for)
“hedge accounting” they will not be reflected in operating cash flow. Similarly,
the effects of most interest rate derivatives will not be reflected in operating cash
flow.18 However, cash flow volatility will capture other types of risk management
activities (e.g., operational hedging with foreign assets), which have been identi-
fied as important hedging tools for exchange rate risk. Thus, cash flow volatility
16Specifically, we define the following industries as commodity price sensitive: oil and gas ex-
traction, mining, utilities, wood products, paper products, petroleum and coal products, chemical
products, plastics and rubber products, primary metals, air transportation, water transportation, and
truck transportation.
17To be precise, net (or posthedging) exposure is a measure of exposure that incorporates the effect
of financial derivatives.
18Nonetheless, most derivative users in our sample use exchange rate and commodity price deriva-
tives. We have also conducted all of our analysis using a measure of earnings, rather than cash flow,
volatility; to conserve space, we do not report the results separately. We find similar, albeit slightly
weaker, results for earnings volatility. This may be because firms take on other financial risks (e.g.,
greater leverage) if they can hedge some financial risks.
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may be affected for derivative users, even if derivatives do not qualify for hedge
accounting, if derivatives are a proxy for broader “corporate hedging.”19
While the risk of assets and liabilities contain different components and their
interactions are difficult to decompose, the assumption of efficient capital markets
suggests that net exposures can be estimated empirically using a company’s stock
price as an aggregate measure of relevant information. Consequently, we construct
different firm-specific risk measures from stock prices. In particular, for each firm
we calculate the standard deviation of its stock returns (σE). We also examine
standardized firm volatility (σ∗E), measured as the ratio of a firm’s stock return
standard deviation to the standard deviation of the returns of the local market
index, to avoid a potential bias from a spurious correlation between derivatives
use and overall market volatility.
The sensitivity of the firm’s stock returns to the local market return is esti-
mated using the standard market model on daily returns,
Rjt − rft = αj + βj (RMt − rft) + εjt,(1)
where Rjt is the stock return of firm j on day t, RMt is the return on the local market
index M on day t, and rft is the (daily) risk-free rate of interest.20 The estimation
period consists of the year for which we have the annual report data. The Newey-
West (1987) procedure is used to correct for autocorrelation and heteroskedastic-
ity. Corporate use of derivatives for hedging purposes would be consistent with
lower stock return volatility and lower measures of posthedging exposures as es-
timated in the regression framework. Overall (net) market exposure is measured
by the estimated value ˆβj.
Table 2 reports statistics for the risk variables used in our analysis. Returns
for individual stocks, pooled across all observations, and the market index are
negative on average over our sample period, –8 basis points (bp) and –4 bp per
day, respectively. Average volatility of operating cash flow, σCF, is 8.25% but
very positively skewed. As a result, we also examine the natural logarithm of
operating cash flow volatility in our statistical analysis. Risk as measured by σE
averages 0.56 and is somewhat positively skewed. Standardizing σE by market
volatility (σ∗E) suggests that the average firm has substantial idiosyncratic risk,
with a standard deviation of return that is more than 2.5 times the market’s volatil-
ity. Estimated market betas average 0.70, indicating that the typical firm in our
sample has relatively low systematic risk. This is likely due to a selection bias
from requiring an annual report in English, certain accounting variables, and cap-
ital markets data. The resulting firms are typically larger, more global, and more
established firms with somewhat lower systematic risk. Despite this, we do see
substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the beta estimates in the sample (more
than 25% of firms in our sample have estimated values for beta that are greater
19As a robustness check we have repeated all of our tests with other measures of profit volatility
and find similar results to those for cash flow volatility. Specifically, we have examined net margin,
ROA, and earnings yield. Selected results using these alternative accounting measures of profits are
discussed in the text.
20As a proxy for the risk-free rate we use 30-day Eurocurrency rates obtained from Datastream or,
when these are unavailable, the shortest-term high quality (e.g., government) rate.
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than 1.0). The betas in our sample are also estimated with a good deal of preci-
sion. The median p-value for a 2-tailed test against a null of 0 is 0.001, and more
than 80% of betas are different from 0 at the 10% confidence level.
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics on Capital Market Data and Risk Measures
Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum, 5th, 25th, 50th (median), 75th, and 95th percentile as
well as the maximum of selected variables. In particular, it shows capital markets data such as the daily returns of the
sample firms and the corresponding returns of the domestic market indices. It also presents descriptive statistics of cash
flow volatility (σCF), the annualized SD of local currency stock returns (σE), and the SD of local currency stock returns
standardized by the SD of the local market index (σ∗E ). Here, β is the coefficient of a regression of stock returns on market
index returns, and p-value is the corresponding significance level. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Percentiles
Variable Mean SD Min 5th 25th Median 75th 95th Max
Panel A. Capital Markets Data
Stock return –0.08 3.71 –12.52 –6.19 –1.50 0.00 1.24 6.12 13.04
Market return –0.04 1.44 –18.24 –2.31 –0.79 0.00 0.73 2.23 17.03
Panel B. Risk and Value Measures
σCF (%) 8.25 12.65 0.59 0.59 1.59 3.36 7.91 50.83 52.91
σCF (log) 1.34 1.19 –0.52 –0.52 0.46 1.21 2.07 3.93 3.97
σE 0.56 0.23 0.18 0.25 0.37 0.51 0.71 1.01 1.16
σ∗E 2.56 1.14 0.72 1.10 1.70 2.32 3.24 4.74 6.05
β 0.70 0.58 –0.18 0.01 0.27 0.57 1.01 1.89 2.55
β (p-values) 0.10 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.65 1.00
q 2.33 2.67 0.42 0.62 1.00 1.43 2.48 7.18 21.22
q (log) 0.51 0.74 –0.86 –0.48 0.00 0.36 0.91 1.97 3.06
We define a proxy for Tobin’s q (q) as the sum of equity market capitaliza-
tion, the book value of total debt, and the book value of preferred stock divided
by the book values of each of these financing sources. The average q in our sam-
ple is 2.33. The primary advantage of this method is its simplicity, which allows
us to create values for nearly all firms in our sample. Alternative measures, such
as those used by Allayannis and Weston (2001), rely on the use of segment and
industrywide investment data that are not available for many of the firms in our
global sample. Table 2 also shows that q is very positively skewed. This skewness
is consistent with the results of many other researchers. As a consequence, simi-
lar to Allayannis and Weston, we also examine the natural logarithm of q in our
statistical analysis.21
IV. Methodology
A. Propensity Score Matching
Previous results in the literature, which we confirm in our sample, sug-
gest that there are substantive differences, on average, in the characteristics of
firms that use derivatives and those that do not. These differences generate a se-
lection bias when estimating the effect of derivatives on a firm and should be
21In the subsequent analysis, we only tabulate results using the natural logarithms of σCF and q for
brevity. However, we have also conducted all of our analysis using the levels of σCF and q. The results
using those levels are qualitatively similar and usually statistically stronger.
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controlled for when we estimate the effect that derivatives have on risk and market
values. Ideally, one would like to estimate the “treatment” effect by observing
the same firm, under identical economic conditions, with derivatives and without
derivatives in place. Since this is not possible, the 1st method we use attempts to
construct a “similar” firm to the user, where to the extent possible the “similar”
firm differs only in its choice not to use derivatives.
TABLE 3
Variable Definitions
Table 3 reports the variables of the study and their definitions.
Variable Definition
Derivatives Dummy variables with value 1 if firm uses derivatives, and 0 otherwise.
Foreign assets International assets / total assets.
Foreign income International operating income / operating income (3-year average).
Foreign sales International sales / net sales or revenues (missing set to 0).
Gross-FX-Exposure Sum of foreign sales and foreign assets (as percent of totals) multiplied by the ratio of home-
country exchange rate volatility to average exchange rate volatility (of all countries in
our sample).
Foreign debt Dummy variable with value 1 if any foreign debt is reported, and 0 otherwise.
Leverage Total debt / size.
Coverage Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) / interest expense on debt (3y).
Quick ratio (Cash & equivalents + receivables (net)) / total current liabilities.
Z-score Altman’s Z-score (6.56× (working capital / total assets) + 3.26× (retained earnings / total
assets) + 6.72× (EBIT / total assets) + 1.05× (book value of equity + preferred stock) /
total debt).
Gross-CP-Exposure Defined at the industry level using U.S. input-output data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis from calendar year 2000. For each industry, we sum the value of inputs from
commodity-sensitive industries, and express it as a percent of total input values.
Industry segments Number of business segments (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes) that make
up the company’s revenue (between 1 and 8).
Size (log) Natural logarithm of the sum of market capitalization, total debt, and preferred stock.
Sales (log) Natural logarithm of total sales.
Dividend (dummy) Dummy variable with value 1 if dividend yield, dividend payout, or dividend per share is
positive, and 0 otherwise.
Gross profit margin Gross income / net sales or revenues (3-year average).
Book-to-market Book value per share / market price-year end.
ROA Return on assets (3-year average).
Cash flow Operating income / sales.
R&D / sales Research and development expense / sales (missing set to 0).
Earnings yield Earnings per share / end-of-year share price of common stock.
CAPEX / sales Capital expenditures / net sales or revenues (missing set to 0).
Tangible assets (Total assets – intangibles) / total assets.
Tobin’s q (log) Size / (book value of equity + total debt + preferred stock) (natural logarithm).
Multiple share class Dummy variable with value 1 if currently multiple share classes exist, and 0 otherwise.
Stock options Dummy variable with value 1 if stock options are reported in the annual report, and 0
otherwise.
Stock return Daily stock return in local currency.
Market return Daily local stock market return in local currency.
Cash flow volatility (σCF) 5-year standard deviation of operating cash flow / sales.
σE Standard deviation of local currency stock returns (annualized).
σ∗E Ratio of the daily local currency stock return standard deviation and the local currency
market index standard deviation.
β Coefficient of the market index from a regression of local currency stock returns on returns
of the local market index.
β (p-value) p-value of the coefficient of the market index from a regression of local currency stock
returns on returns of the local market index.
Alpha Intercept from a regression of local currency stock returns on returns of the local market
index.
Sales growth 4-year growth rate of sales (4y).
Age (log) Natural logarithm of the age of the firm in years.
Derivative market rank Inverse ranking of the size of the derivatives market relative to the market of the other coun-
tries in the sample. Size is calculated by summing daily turnover in the exchange rate
and interest rate markets in 2001 for nonfinancial firms and standardizing by nominal
GDP. We use the rank because the unranked values are extremely positively skewed
by countries with exchange rate trading centers (e.g., the U.K.).
Rather than matching on several individual firm characteristics or covariates,
the method we choose matches on the propensity score (the estimated likelihood
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that a firm will use derivatives). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that matching
on the covariates and matching on the propensity score will both result in a dis-
tribution of the covariates in the treated and untreated groups that is the same. An
advantage of propensity score matching is that it eliminates the “curse of dimen-
sionality” when one wishes to match on several characteristics. A disadvantage
of propensity score matching is that a large sample is required to obtain a mean-
ingful match on the propensity scores (i.e., one that allows for a precise mea-
surement of the treatment effect). (See Zhao (2004) for more discussion on this
point.)
To use this method, we model the likelihood that a firm will choose to use
derivatives, H(Wi), based on a set of variables Wi. That is, we model
Hi = γ′Wi + ui,(2)
where the observed value of Hi is 1 if the firm chooses to use derivatives, and 0
otherwise. The variables Wi are the characteristics of the firm that are expected to
influence the choice of whether a firm uses derivatives. After the propensity scores
are estimated, one can choose to match a user to the single nonuser with the most
similar propensity score, or to a weighted grouping of nonusers, whose weighted-
average propensity score is similar to that of the user. One can match with or with-
out replacement and also set up boundaries or “calipers” of various magnitudes,
outside of which no matches are chosen. We use various combinations of these
choices to ensure that our results are robust. We also examine various choices of
the variables that are presumed to influence derivative use, Wi.
B. Selection Bias
Clearly, if there are unobserved or hidden variables that affect the decision
to use derivatives, a bias may remain in the estimated effect. One advantage of
the propensity score matching technique is that it allows for a sensitivity analysis
on this selection bias. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that it is possible to construct an
upper bound on the influence that any omitted variable would have to have on
the hedging choice in order to overturn the inferences drawn. We estimate this
bound and provide a comparison to the effect that any hidden bias must have,
relative to the influence of the observable characteristics of the firms, to overturn
the original inference. Thus, while we are not able to rule out the influence of a
hidden characteristic, we can provide a benchmark for how large the effect would
have to be, compared to well-known firm characteristics, to change the inferences
drawn from the analysis.
C. Variable Choice
Many firm characteristics have been hypothesized to be relevant for the
relationship between derivatives use and measures of risk and value and are there-
fore candidates for use as control variables. In particular, derivative use has been
shown to be related to industrial diversification (number of industry segments),
firm size (natural logarithm of total assets or alternatively the sum of equity
market capitalization, total debt, and preferred stock), and tangible assets (as a
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fraction of total assets). Firms with more growth options, as measured by research
and development (R&D) expenses (relative to total sales) and capital expenditures
(CAPEX) (relative to total sales) have been shown to be more likely to use deriva-
tives (see, e.g., Ge´czy et al. (1997)). As Jin and Jorion (2006) point out, firms in
certain industries may be more likely to hedge if, for example, they are exposed
to more readily identified, larger, or more easily hedged types of risk.
Finally, access to derivatives markets could have an important effect on a
firm’s ability to execute hedging strategies. Alternatively, easy access to deriva-
tives may facilitate engaging in derivatives transactions for purposes other than
hedging because the costs of entering transactions (or more generally markets)
are lower and therefore less likely to require extraordinary actions on the part of
managers. As a proxy for access to derivatives markets, we use a proxy for the rel-
ative size of the derivatives market in a company’s home country as measured by
the derivatives market rank (Bartram, Brown, and Fehle (2009)). The definitions




To begin, we compare the simple averages of risk characteristics in our
sample categorized by derivative use. These results are presented in Table 4.
We measure the significance of differences between the 2 types of firms using
nonparametric Wilcoxon tests. Table 4 reports the p-values of these tests together
with the means, medians, and differences in means of firm characteristics for
derivative users and nonusers. While the results in Table 4 only refer to gen-
eral derivatives use, the tests are also conducted separately for foreign exchange
rate derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and commodity price derivatives, and
differences are mentioned in the text where appropriate.
Panel A of Table 4 shows that firms using derivatives are more exposed to ex-
change rate risk on a prehedging basis: They have significantly more foreign sales,
foreign income, foreign assets, and higher Gross-FX-Exposure. This is consistent
with the use of derivatives for hedging. As measured by the existence of for-
eign debt, the liabilities of derivative users are also significantly more exposed to
exchange rate risk (though foreign debt is also used as a risk management tool by
many multinational corporations). In addition, derivative users have significantly
higher gross interest rate exposure, as measured by higher leverage and lower
quick ratios. In contrast, users have higher coverage ratios. Firms are more likely
to belong to commodity-sensitive industries if they use derivatives (we observe a
higher mean Gross-CP-Exposure for firms that use derivatives compared to those
that do not). Overall, the results strongly suggest that firms are more likely to
use derivatives if they have higher gross (i.e., prehedging) exposure. These tests,
based on firm characteristics, are robust to analyzing derivatives separately on
exchange rate risk, interest rate risk, or commodity price risk.
For most firms, asset and liability risks are unlikely to be independent. Con-
sequently, we examine more comprehensive risk measures based on the firms’
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TABLE 4
Univariate Tests of Corporate Risk Measures and Derivatives Use
Table 4 presents the number of observations (N), mean, median, and difference in mean of different risk characteristics for
derivative users and derivative nonusers. The last column presents p-values of Wilcoxon rank sum tests between derivative
users and nonusers. All variables are defined in Table 3.
User Nonuser
Difference Wilcoxon
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median in Means p-Value
Panel A. Gross Exposure
Foreign sales 4,167 0.272 0.152 2,721 0.164 0.000 0.108 <0.001
Foreign income 2,421 0.235 0.056 1,477 0.143 0.000 0.092 <0.001
Foreign assets 2,349 0.182 0.099 1,205 0.114 0.000 0.068 <0.001
Gross-FX-Exposure 4,167 0.379 0.196 2,721 0.176 0.000 0.203 <0.001
Foreign debt 4,167 0.882 1.000 2,721 0.725 1.000 0.157 <0.001
Leverage 4,091 0.297 0.254 2,643 0.189 0.081 0.108 <0.001
Quick ratio 4,052 1.380 0.913 2,616 2.455 1.345 1.075 <0.001
Coverage 4,114 3.852 3.657 2,655 2.542 3.333 1.310 <0.001
Gross-CP-Exposure 4,167 0.151 0.106 2,721 0.114 0.051 0.100 <0.001
Panel B. Net Risk and Value
σCF (%) 3,365 6.200 2.848 1,768 12.162 4.994 –5.962 <0.001
σCF (log) 3,365 1.144 1.046 1,768 1.717 1.608 –0.573 <0.001
σE 4,167 0.510 0.461 2,721 0.624 0.604 –0.114 <0.001
σ∗E 4,167 2.380 2.140 2,721 2.842 2.705 –0.462 <0.001
β 4,165 0.686 0.540 2,721 0.732 0.618 –0.046 <0.001
q 3,980 2.154 1.392 2,559 2.605 1.564 –0.451 0.005
q (log) 3,980 0.480 0.331 2,559 0.556 0.447 –0.076 0.005
Alpha 4,165 –0.061 0.008 2,721 –0.236 –0.114 0.175 <0.001
Panel C. Other Firm Characteristics
Z-score 3,566 5.515 3.471 1,971 8.888 5.688 –3.373 <0.001
Size (log) 4,126 6.580 6.555 2,680 4.783 4.731 1.797 <0.001
Sales (log) 4,091 6.713 6.691 2,643 5.063 4.941 1.650 <0.001
Industry segments 4,150 3.823 3.000 2,710 3.420 3.000 0.403 <0.001
Dividend (dummy) 4,167 0.598 1.000 2,721 0.400 0.000 0.198 <0.001
R&D / size 4,167 0.044 0.000 2,721 0.121 0.000 –0.077 <0.001
CAPEX / size 4,172 0.126 0.050 2,724 0.174 0.047 –0.048 0.011
Tangible assets 3,882 0.874 0.943 2,554 0.888 0.973 –0.014 <0.001
Stock options 4,172 0.828 1.000 2,724 0.792 1.000 0.036 <0.001
Sales growth 3,452 10.513 6.450 1,821 13.774 8.861 –3.261 <0.001
Derivative market rank 4,167 38.299 43.000 2,721 36.083 41.000 2.216 <0.001
cash flow measures and stock returns. Studying stock prices is informative, since
they represent an aggregate measure of asset and liability risk and should also
incorporate the effects of financial risk management. If derivatives are used for
hedging purposes, firms with high prehedging exposure should be more likely to
use them and, consequently, might exhibit similar, or even lower, posthedging
(net) exposure.
Despite the higher exposures documented in Panel A of Table 4, the univari-
ate results in Panel B of Table 4 shows that derivative users have significantly
lower cash flow volatility, total risk, and market risk. In particular, the average
σCF (log) is more than 30% lower for users, and σE and σ∗E are about 20% lower
for derivative users. Likewise, market betas are on average about 6% lower for
derivative users. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that, on
average, firms are hedging rather than speculating with derivatives. At a univari-
ate level, the unadjusted Tobin’s q of the average derivative user is 17% lower
than for the average firm that does not use derivatives. However, we also see that
the unconditional relative performance of users as measured by the market-model
alpha is significantly higher in our sample period.
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Panel C of Table 4 shows that there are further significant differences in the
characteristics of firms that use derivatives and those that do not. For example,
derivative users have lower Z-scores, are significantly larger, and are more diver-
sified. They are also more likely to pay dividends and to have executive stock
options. However, derivative users also tend to have fewer tangible assets, lower
R&D expenses, and lower CAPEX. As expected, firms are more likely to use
derivatives if the market for derivatives (among dealers) is more developed.
We repeat the analysis for the firm-specific variables in Table 4 after each
variable has been adjusted for country and industry fixed effects (results are not
tabulated). The results are largely unaffected, although in some instances statisti-
cal significance is reduced. The most striking difference in this respect is that users
no longer have a significantly lower q after taking country and industry effects
into account. The results for risk measures are quite similar to those presented in
Table 4. Overall, the univariate results suggest that nonfinancial firms use deriva-
tives in line with hedging motives. These findings also clearly show large dif-
ferences in the characteristics of derivative users and nonusers that should be
controlled for. In the next section, we undertake a multivariate analysis for this
purpose.
B. Multivariate Results
1. Propensity Score Matching: Risk Measures
We begin with a matching analysis. Specifically, we match derivative users
with nonusers on the basis of their propensity score, which is a measure of the
firms’ propensity to use derivatives based on the firms’ unique characteristics.
Several choices must be made in order to use propensity score matching. As in
any matching analysis, in making these choices we are trading off the precision
of the matching criteria against the sample size. We explore a number of different
specifications and present several representative specifications. In general, our
results are robust across most specifications; we note differences in results where
they occur.
In conducting the propensity score matching the first choice is the selection
of independent variables that are hypothesized to influence firms’ likelihood of
using derivatives. We use variables that have been shown elsewhere to be associ-
ated with derivative use and risk exposure, as well as variables that incorporate the
broader nature of our sample. Specifically, we include Altman’s (1968) Z-score,
firm size, leverage, a liquidity variable (quick ratio), and a market access variable
(a dummy variable for multiple share classes). In some specifications we also
include a variable related to managerial incentives to hedge (stock option use),
Gross-FX-Exposure, a dummy variable for existence of foreign currency debt, as
well as country and industry dummy variables (where noted). For q, we also in-
clude variables shown by other studies to be associated with firm value such as
dividend payout, sales growth, R&D expenditures, and CAPEX.
The most important determinants of derivatives use are not surprising.
Consistent with the univariate results, firm size, leverage, the multiple share class
dummy variable, the stock options dummy variable, exchange rate exposure,
and the foreign debt dummy variable are positively related to the probability
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of derivative use, whereas the Z-score and quick ratio exhibit negative relations.
In addition, many, but not all, industry and country dummy variables are statisti-
cally different from each other. Furthermore, matching on these factors is impor-
tant for our analysis, since other studies have shown some to be related to risk and
value measures. For example, Bartram, Brown, and Stulz (2011) find that firm
size, leverage, and liquidity are important determinants of both total risk and sys-
tematic risk. Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that size, growth, leverage, and
dividends are related to firm value. The relations we observe are intuitive (results
are not tabulated). Larger firms are likely to have more stable sales and thus lower
cash flow and equity price risk. Conversely, firms with more financial leverage or
that have a higher chance of financial distress should have higher risk. Firm value
is increasing in firm profitability and growth, since these lead to higher cash flows
to equity holders, but is decreasing with age and size, since these firms are likely
to be more established and thus less likely to have large new profit opportunities.
The second choice in the matching analysis is the construction of the match-
ing nonuser. The analysis can simply choose a single, “nearest neighbor” match,
or use a weighted average of many (or all) nonusers to construct a match. One can
sample from the nonusers with or without replacement. One can set conditions
outside of which no matches will be found (i.e., caliper matching). We conduct
our analysis using 2 different matching criteria (with and without replacement),
and 3 different choices of matching parameters, for 6 specifications in all.
In assessing the propensity score method’s success, it is important to know
the extent to which the propensity score matching succeeds in removing the
selection bias in the observed characteristics of firms in the 2 subsamples. Conse-









where μT and sT are the sample mean and standard deviation of the character-
istic for the user, and μC and sC are the sample mean and standard deviation
for the characteristic in the matching control firms, respectively. In general, the
matching methods substantially reduce the difference in characteristics across test
and matched firms (although to save space, we do not tabulate the results). With-
out propensity score matching, we find that the bias in the characteristics in the
raw data is quite large; for example, the bias in market capitalization is greater
than 90%, while the biases in leverage, foreign exposure, and foreign debt are
all greater than 40%. The specifications that allow for replacement of the non-
treated firms in the sample reduce the bias so that none of the characteristics is
associated with a bias of more than 16%, and most are below 10%.22 Overall, the
matching procedure does a good job of producing “balanced covariates” across
the 2 subsamples.
22While both of the matching specifications we consider reduce the bias considerably, the spec-
ification that does not allow for replacement still contains substantial biases with respect to market
capitalization, foreign debt, and foreign exchange rate exposure.
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In the subsequent analysis, we examine results from all 6 methods but only
report results using matching with replacement to save space. We discuss
differences when appropriate. We prefer the results with replacement because this
leads to greater reductions in selection bias (as noted previously), maximizes the
sample size of derivative users, and eliminates the need to determine which deriva-
tive users to include in the analysis. Regardless, our conclusions are not sensitive
to whether we examine results of tests with or without replacement.
Table 5 presents the results of representative propensity score estimation for
each of the 4 primary variables we examine (σCF, σE, β, and q). For each of
these 4 variables, we report the number of firms, mean, and median values of the
characteristic for the firms that use derivatives and those that do not, and provide
a measure of the difference in means as well as a statistical test of the significance
of the difference between the 2 subsamples of firms.
TABLE 5
Matched-Sample Tests of Corporate Risk Measures and Derivatives Use
Table 5 presents the number of observations (N), mean, and median of different outcome variables for derivative users
and derivative nonusers. The last column presents p-values of Wilcoxon rank sum tests between derivative users and
nonusers. Results are tabled for cash flow volatility (σCF), total risk as measured by the annualized standard deviation of
stock returns (σE), market betas (β) estimated using equation (1), and Tobin’s q. Specification 1 reports results for cash
flow volatility, stock return volatility, and market betas using the independent variables: Z-score, leverage, quick ratio,
size (log), multiple share classes, stock options, gross exchange rate exposure, foreign currency debt, and industry and
country dummy variables, and for Tobin’s q, the independent variables Z-score, sales growth, R&D / size, CAPEX / size,
age (log), quick ratio, sales (log), dividend (dummy), multiple share classes, stock options, gross exchange rate exposure,
foreign currency debt, and industry and country dummy variables. Specification 2 reports results for the same variables as
specification 1 except gross exchange rate exposure, foreign currency debt but also uses the matching options “caliper
(0.01) trim(1) common.” Specification 3 reports results for cash flow volatility, stock return volatility, and market betas
using the independent variables: Z-score, size (log), leverage, multiple share classes, quick ratio, and for Tobin’s q, the
independent variables Z-score, sales growth, R&D / size, CAPEX / size, age (log), sales (log), dividend, and multiple share
classes. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Users Nonusers
Variable: Country and Diff. in Wilcoxon
Specification Industry Dummies N Mean Median Mean Median Means p-Value
σCF (log):
1 Yes 2,440 0.997 0.907 1.074 0.945 –0.077 <0.001
2 Yes 2,440 0.996 0.907 1.152 1.019 –0.156 <0.001
3 No 2,510 1.000 0.913 1.215 1.110 –0.215 <0.001
σE:
1 Yes 3,490 0.500 0.456 0.524 0.495 –0.024 <0.001
2 Yes 3,490 0.500 0.456 0.546 0.512 –0.046 <0.001
3 No 3,507 0.498 0.454 0.551 0.519 –0.053 <0.001
β:
1 Yes 3,490 0.663 0.528 0.745 0.653 –0.138 <0.001
2 Yes 3,490 0.663 0.528 0.757 0.700 –0.113 <0.001
3 No 3,507 0.661 0.528 0.806 0.712 –0.249 <0.001
q:
1 Yes 2,076 0.451 0.312 0.385 0.255 0.066 0.015
2 Yes 1,956 0.453 0.323 0.401 0.291 0.052 0.089
3 No 2,137 0.454 0.315 0.329 0.238 0.125 <0.001
Regardless of the parameters chosen for the construction of the matching
nonderivative users, we find significantly lower values for cash flow volatility
(σCF), standard deviation of returns (σE), and beta risk (β) for firms that use
derivatives. Across the various specifications, the differentials in σCF range from
approximately 8% to 20%; for σE the reduction varies from between 5% to 10%;
the differential in β varies from between 15% and 31%. Calculating the differ-
entials using medians gives a similar result, as do all the other specifications we
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consider. Differences of this magnitude should have a material effect on a firm’s
cost of capital. For example, consider the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
with a 5% market risk premium; a decline in β of 0.15 results in a 75-bp
reduction in the cost of equity.
Regardless of the specification, we find that the average values of q for firms
that use derivatives are higher than for those that do not; however, the result is
statistically weaker than the risk results, with p-values across specifications rang-
ing between <0.001 and 0.100. The magnitude of the estimated effect also varies
across different specifications, but is always economically large, ranging from
about 7% to 14% (in levels).
The results in Table 5 suggest that, after controlling for other firm char-
acteristics, derivative contract use is associated with statistically and econom-
ically significantly lower cash flow and stock return volatility, as well as with
lower systematic risk. The statistical evidence for an increase in value is weaker;
however, the economic magnitude of the estimated change in value is always
nontrivial.
2. What about the Selection Bias?
Although the propensity score matching represents one way to correct for
selection bias, it assumes that all of the differences between firms that drive the
difference in derivative use are observable; Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call
this assumption “unconfoundedness.” More specifically, they assume that obser-
vations with the same propensity score have the same distribution of unobservable
characteristics, independent of their treatment status. If this assumption does not
hold then there will be a hidden bias in the results. That is, if there are unobserved
variables that affect whether a firm decides to use derivatives, as well as the risk
and value outcomes, then our inferences may be incorrect.
Since the problem variables are, by definition, unobserved, we cannot
estimate their effect directly. However, using the propensity score matching tech-
nique, Rosenbaum (2002) calculates a bound on how large an effect the unob-
served variables would have to have on the selection process in order to change
the inferences provided by the propensity score matching analysis. Intuitively,
this bound is based on the calculation of an odds ratio. If 2 firms have identi-
cal observable characteristics, the expected value of the odds ratio that they will
choose to use derivatives is 1 in the absence of a hidden bias. However, if there is
a hidden bias in the estimation, and the firms differ in the unobserved character-
istic, then the chance that the firms will differ in their choice of derivatives varies
more widely, and the precision of the inferences declines. The calculation of the
bounds is essentially a sensitivity analysis; first, one sets the size of the hidden
bias, and thus the size of its effect on the odds ratio, to a particular level. Next,
following Rosenbaum, one recalculates a new (larger) confidence interval for the
p-value on the difference of each of the relevant characteristics based on this level
of hidden bias. The level of hidden bias is then incremented, and the recalculation
is repeated.23 As DiPrete and Gangl (2004) point out, the Rosenbaum bound is
23We calculate these bounds individually for each characteristic. Although one could in theory
calculate a joint bound for a combination of variables, this requires that one assumes, or separately
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a “worst-case” scenario: It tells the observer not that the treatment effect is not
present, but at what point the confidence interval would include 0 “if this [unob-
served] variable’s effect . . . was so strong as to almost perfectly determine [the
effect of derivative use] for each pair of matched cases in the data.” In that respect,
the results of the Rosenbaum bound analysis are conservative.
In Table 6, we calculate the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds for the matching
specifications presented in Table 5, where the variables of interest are σCF, σE, β,
and q. The gamma variable indicates the generated, or preset, size of the hidden
bias for each specification, which is required for the critical p-value associated
with that inference to be larger than 0.05. For example, a gamma of 1.5 indicates
that the unobserved variable is associated with a 50% change in the odds ratio
of whether a firm uses derivatives. In row 1 of Panel A, the bias level (gamma
value) of 1.18 is associated with the critical probability of 5%; thus, to overturn
the inference on cash flow volatility in the data, or, equivalently, to become less
than 95% confident that derivative use is associated with a decline in cash flow
volatility, users would have to be 18% more likely to possess some hidden trait
than nonusers. Clearly, higher values of gamma suggest a less important potential
hidden bias problem.
Once the bound is calculated, the interpretation of how severe the hidden
bias problem is, or the economic interpretation of the level of gamma required to
overturn inferences, is subjective. However, following DiPrete and Gangl (2004),
we can compare the change in inferences, which is potentially caused by unob-
served variables, given by the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds, to the equivalent effect
of observed variables, since we have estimates of the effect of the observables on
the decision to use derivatives. These values are given in the remaining (numeric)
columns of Table 6.
For example, in the first specification for σE, we see that for an unobserved
variable to cause a hidden bias that affects our inferences on standard deviation
of total return, that variable would have to have an effect equivalent to at least a
difference of 0.40 in leverage. This difference is approximately twice the average
leverage level of nonusers in the sample, or approximately 1.5 times the standard
deviation of leverage for nonusers. Similarly, a missing variable would have to
be equivalent to the effect of a difference in log size of 1.07. This represents a
dollar difference of about $2 billion, or several times the average market value of
nonusers in our sample.
The general interpretation for the inferences on the effect of derivative use on
total risk and systematic risk is similar: To overturn the inference that derivative
use reduces risk, an unobserved confounding variable must have an impact that
is comparable in magnitude to economically large changes in firm characteristics,
such as leverage, market capitalization, or risk exposure. Moreover, such an un-
observed variable would have to be unrelated to the other control variables we
use. The inferences for the effect of derivative use on cash flow risk appear to be
estimates, the relation between the combination of characteristics of interest (see DiPrete and Gangl
(2004) for an example of such a specification). Given the large number of characteristics we consider,
and the difficulty in estimating their interrelationships, we do not perform such an analysis. Conse-
quently, the bounds we report should be interpreted with some caution. It is certainly possible that










Rosenbaum Bounds for Matching
Table 6 presents the Rosenbaum (2002) bounds and hidden bias equivalents for different outcome variables. Each set of results shows columns for gamma (the change in the odds ratio), for a critical p-value of
0.05 as well as hidden bias equivalents for various firm characteristics for each of the 3 specifications reported in Table 5. Users and nonusers are matched by propensity scores sampling without replacement.
Panel A shows results for cash flow volatility (σCF), stock return volatility (σE), and market betas (β). Panel D reports results for Tobin’s q (log). Propensity scores are based on the set of variables in the column
headings as well as industry and country dummy variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Country and Multiple Share Exchange
Specification Gamma Industry Dummies Z-Score Leverage Quick Ratio Size (log) Classes Stock Options Rate Exposure Foreign Debt
Panel A. Cash Flow Volatility, Stock Return Volatility, and Market Betas
σCF (log):
1 1.18 Yes –15.03 0.36 –1.94 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.68 0.24
2 1.04 Yes –3.42 0.08 –0.46 0.13 0.13
3 1.33 No –18.76 13.51 –2.73 1.02 1.99
Mean 1.31 –12.40 4.65 –1.71 0.58 0.89 0.49 0.68 0.24
σE:
1 1.36 Yes –69.61 0.40 –4.76 1.07 1.46 0.97 1.93 0.43
2 1.15 Yes –28.07 0.18 –2.18 0.47 0.71
3 1.50 No –51.09 0.79 4.41 1.27 2.59
Mean 1.28 –49.59 0.46 –0.84 0.94 1.59 0.97 1.93 0.43
β:
1 1.27 Yes –54.11 0.31 –3.72 0.83 1.14 0.75 1.50 0.34
2 1.19 Yes –34.94 0.23 –2.71 0.58 1.24
3 1.44 No –50.14 0.76 –4.33 1.25 2.54
Mean 1.26 –46.40 0.43 –3.59 0.89 1.64 0.75 1.50 0.34
Country and Multiple Share
Specification Gamma Industry Dummies Z-Score Sales GrowthR&D / Sales CAPEX / Size Age (log) Quick Ratio Dividend Classes Sales (log) Foreign Debt
Panel B. Tobin’s q
1 1.06 Yes –2.87 –19.79 –0.21 0.06 –6.55 –6.10 –1.63 0.20 0.17
2 1.00 Yes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 1.29 No –15.07 –28.68 –16.01 0.28 –1.69 –39.85 1.96 0.81
Mean 1.08 –5.98 –16.16 –5.41 0.11 –2.75 –6.10 –13.83 0.72 0.33
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slightly more sensitive to selection bias. For example, in specification 2 if users
are only about 5% more likely to possess some hidden characteristic that is asso-
ciated with derivative use, the inferences could be overturned. In the remaining
specifications, the magnitude of the hidden bias is large and roughly comparable
to those estimated for total risk. The average gammas and sensitivities are com-
parable to those for total risk and systematic risk.24
Finally, the results with respect to the value premium appear to be even more
sensitive to hidden bias, using most of the propensity score matching techniques.
For example, specification 2 shows that inferences are potentially overturned at
any level of bias.25 Consequently, the effect of derivative use on market value is
highly affected by even a small degree of selection bias in the sample. The sensi-
tivity of the value differential associated with derivative use to selection bias may
explain the mixed results in the literature. This result suggests that the estimated
value premium (or discount) may be heavily dependent on the sample, the control
variables used, and the specification method employed in the tests. At a minimum,
these results suggest that the inference that hedging increases firm value should
be treated very cautiously.
3. Robustness Checks
We conduct a series of robustness checks on our results. As a robustness
check on the matching results, we use the same binary variable to measure deriva-
tive use, and estimate a treatment effects model as in Heckman (1979). We find
similar results: Derivative use is associated with significantly lower measures of
risk. Likewise, the relation of derivative use to Tobin’s q is significantly positive.
We also use a measure of derivative use intensity, rather than merely derivative
use, as the variable of interest, as well as an instrumental variables technique to
measure the effect of derivative use on the firm.26 The results are similar in sign,
but weaker in statistical significance. The use of a broader array of derivative con-
tracts is associated with lower cash flow volatility; the results for idiosyncratic
volatility and systematic risk are negative, but not statistically significant, while
the relation between additional contract use and relative market value is positive
but not statistically significant. This indicates that the documented differences in
risk and value are more strongly associated with any use of derivatives rather than
the extent of use of derivatives. In turn, this may suggest that derivative use serves
as a proxy for broader financial risk management policies.27
24In some cases, the change in the independent variable that would be required to overturn the
bounds is not physically possible. For example, consider the change in the Z-score column where
large negative changes (e.g., 15.03, observed in row 1) would not be observable. This suggests that the
inferences about the effect of derivative use on risk could not be overturned by any possible change
in this measure of financial distress. Of course, this does not imply that another, omitted variable may
not be important, but this variable must be unrelated to the Z-score.
25Note that the p-value is above the critical value at a gamma level of 1.0. Recall that in this
specification of the propensity score matching, the difference in Tobin’s q across users and nonusers
is not significant (see Table 5).
26From these binary variables, we create a variable equal to the sum of the categories for which we
document firms using derivatives. For example, a firm that uses exchange rate forwards, exchange rate
options, and interest rate swaps would have a hedging intensity of 3.
27Related to this test, we examined differences in the risk measures of firms that use only interest
rate derivatives and firms that used interest rate derivatives along with some other contract(s). Since
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Finally, we estimate a series of simultaneous equations models, similar to the
specification employed in Graham and Rogers (2002), in which derivatives use
and 3 alternate measures of risk (volatility of cash flow, standard deviation, and
normalized standard deviation of returns) are dependent variables in a system of
2 equations that include other control variables. In untabulated results (available
from the authors), we continue to find that derivative use is associated with a
decline in the volatility of all 3 measures of risk, with p-values on the coefficient
associated with derivative use ranging from 0.03 to 0.06.
These models also have the advantage that we can estimate the effects of
other variables on firm risk and value after accounting for the use of derivatives.
We find that line-of-business diversification, dividend payout, and profitability
tend to be negatively related to σCF, σE, and β; leverage is positively related to
σE and negatively related to σCF and β, whereas Gross-FX-Exposure is usually
positively related to all 3 measures. Interestingly, firm size is positively related to
σCF and β, but not a significant determinant of σE. For q we find that firm size,
dividend payout, R&D expenditures, and leverage have negative coefficients, and
profitability has a positive coefficient. We find no evidence of a diversification
discount (i.e., the coefficient on the number of industry segments variable is not
statistically significant). The result for R&D expenditures is somewhat surprising
but may be the result of the sample period when tech companies with high R&D
spending had low market returns.
Overall, the results from using alternative measures of derivative use, as well
as different methods, are consistent with those presented previously: The use of
derivatives by firms is associated with a significant decline in risk, while effects
on value tend to be positive but statistically weaker.
C. Time-Series Evidence
As noted already, our sample period encompasses a period of economic de-
cline and a sharp market correction. During 2001, the majority of countries in our
sample experienced a significant economic downturn with many experiencing a
recession. For example, the United States experienced a recession from March
2001 through November 2001 and a so-called “jobless recovery” for more than
the next 12 months. Global equity markets also declined sharply in this period,
with the U.S. markets experiencing decline in each year from 2000 to 2002. The
economic and financial dislocation led to an uptick in corporate bankruptcies as
well as a drastic decline in new and seasoned equity issuances.28 Consequently, if
one goal of financial risk management with derivatives is to lower the probability
interest rate derivatives by themselves should not affect operating cash flows (only net income), any
differences in the volatility of operating cash flow should be attributable to the direct effects of (other)
hedging on risk. In matching tests, however, there is no significant difference between firms that use
only interest derivatives and those that use more extensive derivative contracts. This is consistent with
(any) derivative use serving as a proxy for a host of risk management strategies employed by the firm,
rather than specific derivative contracts each having a discretely measurable effect on different risks
borne by the firm.
28For example, data provided by Jay Ritter (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/publ papers/IPOALL.xls)
show that the number of initial public offerings in the United States declined from 505 in 1999 to only
84 in 2001.
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of financial distress, then firms that manage risk may have experienced significant
benefits during this period.
We examine this hypothesis by calculating the time series of annual differ-
ences in adjusted risk measures (1998–2003) for firms in our sample that use, and
do not use, derivatives. We compute these differences only across the subsamples
of firms for which sufficient data are available. Since several additional years of
data are necessary to calculate cash flow volatility, we omit this variable from our
analysis. We assume that derivative use is constant over this time period and so
classify firms as users or nonusers over the entire period.29
Table 7 reports the results of this analysis using the matched sample method
presented in Table 5; for brevity, we report results for only 1 matching specifica-
tion (specification 1 in previous tables). In Panel A, we present the time series of
2 risk measures, σE and β. Results for σE show that derivative users have lower
total risk in each year (at better than the 0.001 significance level). The difference
in 2000 is the largest but does not stand out. Results for β also show consistently
lower levels of risk for derivative users. The results are fairly stable across years,
with the differences for 2000 and 2001 only slightly higher than the average of
all years. The economic significance of these results is similar to that observed in
Table 5.
Although we observe consistently lower levels of risk for derivative users
throughout our sample period, lower risk may add more value in times of financial
or economic declines. To examine this possibility, Panel B of Table 7 presents 2
measures of value: annual differences in Tobin’s q, and measures of alpha (αj)
from our estimates of equation (1).
Measured by Tobin’s q, the only year with a statistically significant premium
(at the 10% confidence level) is 2001 (a year that witnessed both the slowest
global gross domestic product (GDP) growth in over a decade and a recession in
the United States). When we examine differences in matched alphas each year,
users experience significantly higher alphas than nonusers in each year except
1998. The positive difference in 2000 is the largest in the sample period and is
economically quite large (5.9%) compared to the average difference across all
years (2%).
Panel C of Table 7 presents the time series of various measures of profitabil-
ity, including ROA, cash flow, and earnings yield. For each measure, profits are
significantly higher (at the 10% confidence level) for derivative users in 2000
through 2002. Just as importantly, the better profitability of derivative users is
due to more stable profits over this 6-year period, with nonusers exhibiting much
sharper declines from 2000 to 2001 than derivative users. For example, ROA de-
clines for derivative users from 0.064 in 2000 to 0.033 in 2001, a drop of about
50%, while it declines by approximately 75% for nonusers. Cash flow declines
by 0.015 from 2000 to 2001 for firms that use derivatives (or approximately 14%)
and by 0.028 (or about 30%) for nonusers in the same period. Earnings yield for
nonusers shows evidence of a decline earlier than derivative users: Earnings in
29To evaluate the validity of this assumption, we examined the use of a random sample of 50 users
and 50 nonusers in 1998 and 2003. Of the firms with available data, 84% of the nonusers and 82% of
the users followed the same strategy in 1998 and 2003 as in 2000–2001.
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TABLE 7
Matched-Sample Tests of Corporate Risk Measures and Derivatives Use across Time
Table 7 presents the mean value of risk measures (Panel A), value measures (Panel B), and profit measures (Panel C) by
year for derivative users and nonusers based on propensity score matched samples. The p-values are from Wilcoxon rank
sum tests between derivative users and nonusers. Results are shown for matching by year with replacement using the
matching options “caliper (0.01) trim(1) common.” The following variables are used as explanatory variables of derivatives
usage. For stock return volatility, market betas, and profit measures: Z-score, leverage, quick ratio, size (log), multiple
share classes, stock options, gross exchange rate exposure, foreign debt, and industry and country dummy variables;
for Tobin’s q and Alpha: Z-score, sales growth, R&D / size, CAPEX / size, age (log), quick ratio, sales (log), dividend
(dummy), multiple share classes, stock options, gross exchange rate exposure, foreign debt, and industry and country
dummy variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Panel A. Risk Measures
σE:
User 0.430 0.422 0.483 0.460 0.443 0.372
Nonuser 0.455 0.456 0.525 0.479 0.467 0.411
Difference –0.025 –0.034 –0.042 –0.019 –0.024 –0.039
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
β:
User 0.698 0.505 0.576 0.694 0.702 0.736
Nonuser 0.792 0.580 0.686 0.814 0.806 0.847
Difference –0.094 –0.075 –0.110 –0.120 –0.104 –0.111
p-value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Panel B. Value Measures
q:
User 0.567 0.564 0.507 0.435 0.287 0.434
Nonuser 0.558 0.577 0.593 0.392 0.267 0.471
Difference 0.009 –0.013 –0.086 0.043 0.020 –0.037
p-value 0.560 0.071 0.001 0.071 0.152 0.001
Alpha (annualized):
User –0.149 –0.010 –0.029 –0.003 –0.061 0.142
Nonuser –0.088 –0.045 –0.088 –0.018 –0.102 0.110
Difference –0.061 0.035 0.059 0.015 0.041 0.032
p-value <0.001 0.004 <0.001 0.047 <0.001 0.007
Panel C. Profit Measures
Return on Assets (ROA):
User 0.063 0.066 0.064 0.033 0.015 0.031
Nonuser 0.055 0.062 0.060 0.015 –0.006 0.029
Difference 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.018 0.021 0.002
p-value 0.045 0.364 0.070 <0.001 <0.001 0.548
Cash Flow:
User 0.108 0.112 0.108 0.093 0.091 0.099
Nonuser 0.087 0.105 0.093 0.065 0.050 0.073
Difference 0.021 0.007 0.015 0.028 0.041 0.026
p-value <0.001 0.415 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Earnings Yield:
User 0.026 0.037 0.031 –0.016 –0.036 –0.006
Nonuser 0.005 0.028 –0.002 –0.049 –0.080 –0.003
Difference 0.021 0.009 0.033 0.033 0.044 –0.003
p-value <0.001 0.012 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.184
2000 for firms that do not use derivatives are essentially 0. And, the decline in
earnings from 1999 through 2001 for derivative users, at –5.3%, is smaller than
for nonusers, at –7.7%.
Taken as a whole, these results suggest important time variation in a firm’s
risk and value measures related to financial or economic conditions. In particular,
it appears that derivative use is more valuable during market downturns. To ex-
amine this possibility further, we condition our analysis on broad market returns
in a firm’s home country. Specifically, we create 2 equal-weighted portfolios that
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are long firms that use derivatives and short matching nonusers: The 1st portfolio
includes companies in countries only when the domestic stock market index is up
for the quarter; likewise, the 2nd portfolio includes companies in countries only
when the domestic stock market index is down for the quarter. We then examine
the risk and return by estimating equation (1) for the years 2000–2002 and cal-
culate the differences in market beta and alpha of each portfolio. We hypothesize
that if hedging provides for lower risk in declining markets then the estimated
beta will be significantly lower for the down-market portfolio as compared to the
up-market portfolio. Similarly, a difference in value would be reflected in signifi-
cantly higher alphas for the down-market portfolio.
Table 8 reports the results of this analysis. The table shows that the beta of the
long-short portfolio is significantly negative in down markets. This simply restates
the previous finding that derivative users have lower betas than nonusers. In addi-
tion, the difference in betas between the down-market and up-market portfolios is
negative, which is consistent with the prediction that hedging provides downside
risk protection: Nonusers are significantly more sensitive to the market portfolio,
compared to firms that use derivatives, during periods of poor market returns. In
fact, the statistically insignificant estimate for the beta of the up-market portfolio
suggests that derivative use only provides for reliably lower risk in down markets,
precisely when one would wish for lower market exposure. The difference in β
between down and up markets of –0.044 is equivalent to about a 6% difference for
the average firm in our sample. The estimates of alpha are similar but not statis-
tically significant for the difference, though the larger value for down markets is
consistent with the hypothesis that hedging adds more value in down markets. In
addition, the magnitude of the down-market alpha is large compared to the annual
values presented in Panel B of Table 7.
TABLE 8
Characteristics of a Portfolio’s Long Users and Short Nonusers
Table 8 reports characteristics of stock portfolios with equal-weighted positive investments in firms that use derivatives
and short positions in matched firms that do not use derivatives. Two portfolios are generated. The 1st portfolio includes
only firms in countries where the local stock market index experiences a positive quarterly return (Domestic Stock Market
Up), and the 2nd portfolio includes only firms in countries where the local stock market index experiences a negative
quarterly return (Domestic Stock Market Down). Values are reported for market beta and alpha. Values are estimated for the
2000–2002 period, which includes 687 down-market observations and 623 up-market observations (no domestic markets
in our sample experienced positive returns in quarters 2 and 3 of 2002). Matched samples are created with replacement
using the matching options “caliper (0.01) trim(1) common.” The following set of variables is used as explanatory variables
of derivatives usage: Z-score, leverage, quick ratio, size, multiple share classes, stock options, gross exchange rate
exposure, foreign debt, and industry and country dummy variables. All variables are defined in Table 3.
Domestic
Stock Market
Variable Down Up Difference
Market Beta –0.074 –0.031 –0.044
p-value <0.001 0.171 0.014
Alpha (annualized) 0.073 0.014 0.059
p-value 0.055 0.787 0.134
Taken together, these results have important implications. First, since the
adjusted-risk measures for firms that use derivatives are lower throughout the
sample period, it is unlikely that the results for 2000–2001 are unique to those
years. Second, and more interestingly, the evidence suggests the possibility that
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derivative use primarily lowers downside risk.30 Third, if part of the risk reduction
from derivative use comes from limiting exposure to financial or economic down-
turns, this provides a direct mechanism for understanding why derivative use
affects market value. Specifically, if derivative use lowers a firm’s business-cycle
risk, this may lead to a lower market beta, a lower discount rate, and therefore a
higher firm value.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a large sample of firms operating in 47 countries to
analyze the effect of derivative use on measures of risk and value. In univariate
tests, we find that derivative use is more prevalent in firms with higher exposures
to interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and commodity prices. Despite higher
exposures, firms that use derivatives have lower estimated values of both total and
systematic risk, suggesting that derivatives are used to hedge risk, rather than to
speculate. There are significant differences between derivative users and nonusers
along other dimensions, emphasizing the importance of multivariate tests.
Our primary multivariate test uses propensity score matching, in which
derivative users and nonusers are matched on the basis of their (estimated) propen-
sity to use derivatives. In robustness checks, we employ 2 other types of multi-
variate tests. Using each method, we find that compared to firms that do not use
derivatives, derivative users have lower cash flow volatility, idiosyncratic volatil-
ity, and systematic risk; these results are robust to a number of different matching
specifications, and the differences are both statistically and economically signif-
icant. This suggests that nonfinancial firms overall employ derivatives with the
motive and effect of risk reduction. Consistent with the evidence in Allayannis
and Weston (2001), derivative use is associated with a value premium, although
the statistical significance of this premium is weak.
We also estimate the potential importance of selection bias on the inferences
drawn from our tests, by estimating bounds beyond which the inferences would
change. These results suggest that the estimated effects of derivative use on risk
measures are robust: While we cannot rule out the possibility that selection bias
is driving our results, any omitted control variable would have to be quite signif-
icant in its effect on risk to overturn the inference that the risk of firms that use
derivatives is lower. In contrast, the value effects of derivative use are quite sensi-
tive to selection bias. This result may explain the differences in inferences in the
literature; even small differences in sample construction, control variables, and
testing method could change the estimated effect.
Finally, we document that the reductions in risk we find are unlikely to be
specific to our primary sample period; however, we do find that market betas vary
30Interestingly, it appears to be downside risk, and not total financial risk, that is lower for firms
that use derivatives. In a separate analysis, we examined the difference in the Altman’s Z-scores of
derivative users and matching nonusers for surviving firms in the 4 years after a firm was classified as a
“user” or “nonuser” (in 2000 or 2001). We find that derivative users have a significantly lower Z-score
in every year from 2002 to 2005. This suggests that firms that use derivatives typically have higher
financial risk. We thank the referee for this suggestion; these results are available from the authors.
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in a way that is consistent with firms hedging downside risk. Lower betas may in-
dicate that hedging has an effect on a firm’s cost of capital and thus the investment
policy and economic profitability of a firm. This in turn may explain why some
of our evidence indicates that users have higher values and risk-adjusted market
returns.
In further analyses, we explore whether firms’ access to derivative markets,
or type of derivative use, influences the effects of derivatives on firms’ risk and
value. We find relatively little evidence that the effects of derivatives vary across
these measures. Although this may suggest that proposed new derivative rules
will not prevent firms from capturing the benefits of risk management, our results
should be interpreted with caution. In our judgment, the cross-sectional differ-
ences in derivative type and access in our sample are too small, and the estimates
of the benefits of derivative use on risk are too large, to make that claim with this
evidence.
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